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The Analytical Philosopher and the Writer 
 
 
I 
In philosophy the matter of the language which is its vehicle – which is a clumsy way of 
putting it, and immediately sets up a distinction which I want to question – is central in a way 
that would not be the case to the same extent in other disciplines. There is first of all the 
question of whether philosophy is best carried out through speech or in writing: a question to 
which Plato is often supposed to have given a definitive answer, both in the legend of the 
origins of writing in the Phaedrus (274b5 ff) and in his choice of the dialogue form. From 
this can be traced many elements of philosophy as it has been practised in Anglophone 
countries in modern times. There is for instance the idea that philosophy is most nearly itself 
in live argument and disputation, in which one interlocutor (a revealing term: one who takes 
part in a conversation) defends a claim while another attempts to reveal its flaws. This can be 
traced all the way to the traditional Oxford tutorial, where the undergraduate student reads 
aloud the essay that he or she has written and then attempts to justify its arguments against 
the criticisms of the tutor. Its influence lingers in the practice of submitting a conference 
paper (a paper, we call it) and then summarising it orally (which we call speaking to it) in the 
live conference session. Before going any further we might note that, in what may seem a 
contrast to this tradition, Plato’s dialogues are written, and that they are carefully, even 
artfully, constructed; a point which is often conveniently forgotten. 
This prejudice in favour of the oral is closely connected with a preference for, or commitment 
to, the analytic style of philosophy as against what is usually called the ‘continental’ style, 
that is to say the style favoured by non-Anglophone philosophers from continental Europe 
and those influenced by them. I say more about this distinction below. Here it is enough 
perhaps to characterise the analytic tradition as emerging from the logical positivism of the 
1930s and 1940s, especially as mediated through such Anglophone philosophers as A.J.Ayer, 
and as constituting the standard approach to academic philosophy in the Anglophone 
countries for the last half century. Its practitioners see themselves as bringing clarity to 
replace muddle and confusion, and they aspire to clarity in their own writing and lecturing. 
Their prose style is by intention plain and unadorned. They may not always notice that this is 
a distinctive style, but it is not stylistically neutral. It has much in common with the style of 
ordinary conversation, and for the most part its devotees see themselves as eschewing the 
figurative and the poetic. These latter ways of writing, they might say, are often the source of 
philosophical confusion. It is thus related to their prose style that they are quick to spot 
common fallacies, such as an undistributed middle (all terriers are dogs, everyone in this 
room owns a dog, so everyone in this room owns a terrier) or a category mistake (such as 
supposing that all talk of the mind must be the same as talk of the brain). When philosophy of 
education started to establish itself as a subject area (or sub-discipline of philosophy: not 
much turns on the distinctions here, in my view) in the UK in the 1960s under the leadership 
of such figures as Richard Peters, Paul Hirst and Robert Dearden, it was analytical 
philosophy that it took as its model.  
Robin Barrow of course places himself squarely in this tradition, as the title of one of his 
papers reminds us: ‘The need for philosophical analysis in a postmodern era’ (1999). Here he 
argues for the importance of a specific understanding of philosophical analysis’ (p. 415, my 
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emphasis), but there is nothing, I think, in his understanding of it that other prominent 
followers of that tradition, whether in philosophy of education or in philosophy more widely, 
would take substantial issue with. Since I shall offer below some criticisms of philosophy 
practised exclusively in this tradition I begin by acknowledging some of its many strengths; 
and since many of those are displayed to virtuoso effect by Robin Barrow himself it is hard to 
do better than quote him at sufficient length to display some of the central features of his 
style. When in 2006 as founding editor of the journal Ethics and Education I sought to 
establish that this was to be a journal of some quality Barrow was one of the people I 
approached to contribute to the first issue. His article is called ‘Moral education’s modest 
agenda’ and it was everything I hoped it would be. Here he is towards the end of the article 
making the classical move of distinguishing moral education from various practices which 
sometimes make false claims to the title. 
The main task in moral education is to clear the ground of all the irrelevant and 
inappropriate practices and ideas that have hitherto been wished upon us. We have to 
throw out systems of behaviour modification, because to condition people to behave 
in certain ways is not to educate them and does not allow them to act freely nor, 
therefore, morally. We have to fight against the indoctrination that is still prevalent 
throughout the world, not least in fundamentalist Christian communities, which closes 
people’s minds around an impoverished set of unprovable and exclusionary rules that, 
again, are not themselves moral and that prevent the development of a moral 
understanding. We have to chase values clarification, and all other programs that 
similarly suggest that the important things are being sincere and articulating one’s 
views rather than holding coherent and rationally justifiable views, out of the schools. 
We have to challenge the contemporary tendency to impose remedies, such as 
therapy, drugs and counseling, on people, rather than tackling the causes of the 
problems. Moralizing, whether directly or indirectly by means, for example, of 
carefully censored texts, is anathema to a true moral education. Developmental 
theories, which are still a staple part of teacher education in North America, continue 
to contribute to a wholly misleading picture of what morality is and how one should 
morally educate the young, essentially because they treat people as physical entities 
with brains but without minds, and because they treat moral education as a matter of 
seizing upon and reinforcing allegedly natural stages of development. Similarly, one 
cannot overestimate the harm that has been and to some extent still is being done to 
the spread of true moral understanding by the insidious influence of political and 
moral correctness. (Barrow, 2006, pp. 12-13) 
There is much to admire here. First, not to be underestimated and certainly not to be taken for 
granted on the part of academics working in the field of education, is the irreproachable 
grammar. Varied in its structures and with a fluency suggestive of speech, its qualities 
include a number of rhetorical devices (this by no means constitutes a criticism: I return to 
this below). We might note the simplicity and forcefulness of the opening sentence, which 
commands the reader’s assent partly by suggesting that reader and writer will be at one in 
what they identify as ‘inappropriate practices and ideas’. The second sentence is more 
complex, and just as the complexity builds towards the end it is cut short by the brevity of the 
assertion that not to act freely is to act non-morally. Something similar occurs in the fourth 
sentence, which ends ‘out of the schools’. The next sentence contains a near-classic tricolon, 
‘therapy, drugs and counseling’, any sense of glibness counteracted by avoiding the common 
device of having the terms increase in number of syllables (such as ‘friends, Romans, 
countrymen’). The long sentence beginning ‘Developmental theories’ makes sophisticated 
points almost in passing: for example that it makes no sense to think of human beings as 
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purely physical beings (‘with brains but without minds’), and that the supposedly ‘natural 
stages of development’ are not natural and are therefore not inevitable at all. The reader is 
here treated with respect, as one on whom these sketches of important theoretical ideas will 
not be wasted, and for whom the long and fairly demanding sentence in which they are set 
will not present an obstacle. The final sentence, when read aloud or vocalised internally,  
invites the inclusion of pauses, of an almost Churchillian nature, depending on just how 
Churchillian one can be without parody:  after ‘Similarly’, at various points up to and 
including ‘being done’, after ‘true moral understanding’ and ‘insidious influence’. Thus the 
paragraph concludes with a sentence of steady and magisterial force. I do not mean to imply 
that the rhetorical qualities here are contrived, or even deliberate. Rather they are, I would 
say, simply the way language naturally falls from the pen of someone with a traditional, 
literary and linguistic as well as philosophical (and in Barrow’s case classical) education.  
Admirable too, I would say, is the unmistakeable presence here of argument. I say 
‘unmistakeable’, yet I have come across readers of philosophy written in this style who 
complain that they are being presented with mere assertion – readers who thus miss both the 
compression of complex arguments at various points (such as the distinction Barrow makes 
between minds and brains) and the implicit invitation here to join in the discussion, to 
respond, to argue back. How different this is from what one might call the standard academic 
journal article on any aspect of education, where the writer cannot make the most banal point 
without supporting it with a string of citations. Barrow offers no detailed citations (although 
Kant, Hume and Mill are mentioned in passing, and Plato makes several appearances), and 
there is thus no list of References at the end. It is interesting to imagine the reaction of those 
refereeing for a standard academic journal. Barrow – would they perceive this? – has the 
courage to speak for himself, and we readers are implicitly invited to lay aside the devices by 
which we insulate ourselves from the uncomfortable business of engaging face to face, as it 
were, with an intelligent human being in argument about things that matter, and speak for 
ourselves in turn. We encounter someone with a profound concern for education, and stand to 
be educated by him. 
This point about the absence of citation and reference is worth developing a little. Nicholas 
Burbules (2012) and others have argued that the academic conventions of citation carry 
particular and substantial implications for how we think of knowledge. For example, one of 
the standard functions of citation is to refer to an empirical study that sets out certain facts or 
at least what are claimed to be facts. If, say, in writing an article on equality in education I 
were to note that more equal societies do better for all their citizens on a range of indicators 
(better educational outcomes, less crime, greater mutual trust...), it would be natural to cite 
Wilkinson and Pickett’s book, The Spirit Level (2009). However particular styles of citation, 
notably APA (American Psychological Association), which employ name of author(s) and 
date, ‘become in standard use the documentation of a fact ... such usage reinforces the idea 
that research is about the examination and testing of empirical claims, and that citation is a 
process of buttressing those claims through referencing supporting studies’ (Burbules). The 
citation of name and date even becomes identified with the familiar claim or fact that it is 
supposed to support, as is the case with Wilkinson and Pickett above. When we also see that 
the APA manual sets out how a research article should be formatted (Literature Review, 
Methods, Results, Discussion) it is clear that research which follows these conventions is 
being conceived essentially as empirical, even quasi-psychological, rather than as 
philosophical, conceptual or, as I want to say, argumentative and thoughtful. The discovery 
and reporting of facts and correlations has become hegemonic.  
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Thus Barrow’s style here (and in a good deal of his other published writings) is not a side-
issue. It is of a piece with his commitment to thoughtful argument. It constitutes an act of 
resistance to the increasing assumption that educational research that is not empirical is not 
really research. That assumption is steadily making itself at home, both in Anglophone 
universities and elsewhere. A colleague in a British university (not my own), a philosopher of 
education, heard his specialism described by his head of department at a departmental 
meeting as ‘Alchemy, or whatever it is you do’. Another colleague in a different university 
was told by one of his department’s ‘managers’ that his philosophical research was ‘hobby 
research’. From a third university again, this time not a philosopher of education but a 
philosophically inclined social scientist, being interviewed for a Professorship, was asked by 
the Chair of the Appointing Committee: ‘You have told us all about your ideas and theories. 
Now what about actual research?’ No doubt there are other factors at work here: for instance 
it is rare for philosophical research to attract external funding, while this is relatively easy for 
even the most banal empirically-based educational research projects. Funding can be 
measured and becomes a proxy for quality. Psychology always looks as if it is bound to be at 
least relevant, and probably important, to education, even if its claims do not always survive 
critical scrutiny. Much more could be said about all this. Barrow himself has of course 
developed some of these points in his 1984 book, Giving Teaching Back to Teachers.  
Finally, in the extract above I admire Barrow’s steady assertion that there is such thing as 
‘true moral understanding’, which I read less as part of a strategy to discover some Platonic 
Form, valid for all time, than as the insistence that for the things we value – education, 
justice, equality, friendship, for example – it is an endless and vital undertaking to distinguish 
the true from the false, the genuine from the fake, the false from the spurious. I called this 
above a ‘classical’ move, in the context of Barrow’s distinction between true moral education 
and practices which only pretend or seem to be that. In the Gorgias Plato has Socrates 
investigate what Holland (1980, pp. 33-4) calls ‘the problem of spurious semblances, of the 
difference between worthwhile pursuits and their time-serving substitutes’. For Plato (or 
Socrates: certainly for the ‘Socrates’ of the Gorgias) the difference is between dialektiké, 
which is, roughly, philosophy understood as an educational practice, and mere rhetoric, or 
persuasive speech-making. The latter is nothing more than snake-oil, an appeal – like certain 
forms of cookery – to what people like or can be got to like rather than to what is good for 
them. 
The reason why rhetoric could not be a form of education was that it had nothing to 
do with knowledge, and the reason why it had nothing to do with knowledge was that 
it involved no criticism of received opinions, no putting of statements to the test, no 
insistence that an account be given of the nature of anything, no sifting the true from 
the false or distinguishing reality from appearance. Instead, success was its sole 
concern and efficacy its standard of excellence. (ibid., p. 19). 
This seems to me to catch the philosophical spirit of Robin Barrow as it runs through 
everything he has written. And how we need this kind of philosophical spirit in our time, as 
we always need it! The mark of a good school now, it seems, is that the children pass the tests 
and the school passes its inspection: success and efficacy are the sole standard of excellence, 
which is understood mainly or entirely as what moves it up the league tables. Undergraduate 
students of education and other students of social science in their first year are generally 
astonished – and usually delighted – to discover in my classes that education has from time to 
time been theorised in more exalted terms, as the widening of horizons, as the expanding of 
the mind, as learning to speak the Oakshottian ‘conversations of mankind’. Even as they learn 
this, however, their degree courses are being rewritten to reduce the demand that students 
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acquire knowledge or criticise received opinions (to echo Holland’s words above), including 
their own existing opinions: this is being done to make their courses easier, in the hope of 
better results in the National Student Satisfaction Survey. Universities in England are now 
becoming funded according to market principles, and accordingly sell themselves with videos 
in which young people leer at each other as they stroll across the thoroughly modern campus 
– just a little ivy and Georgian brickwork to add a touch of class – between coffee shops and 
up-to-the-minute IT facilities. In the market appearance is reality if it brings in the 
consumers, since the market admits no other criterion of quality than what appeals and can be 
sold. And since they are now consumers students must naturally be given what they want 
rather than what is good for them, their received opinions pandered to and flattered. This is to 
be the fate of the university. We should pause to register this extraordinary development. The 
university, generally until now thought of as a place dedicated to the pursuit and testing of 
knowledge, of  ‘putting of statements to the test’ (Holland’s words again), and still in the 
view of many one of the few places left among the beleaguered public services of England 
dedicated to ‘sifting the true from the false or distinguishing reality from appearance’, is 
apparently to give its customers what they want, as if it was just one more commercial outlet 
dealing in boutique clothing or electronic gadgets. 
This is one reason why philosophy, and Barrow’s way of doing philosophy, still matter. 
 
II 
The purpose of this second section is not to offer substantial criticisms of Barrow’s way of 
doing philosophy, as if to balance the appreciation expressed in the first section. What is 
admirable in it is still to be admired. The purpose is rather to ask if the strengths of analytical 
philosophy, both in general and in the case of Robin’s preferred version of it, cannot be 
achieved without drawbacks and limitations, just as there cannot be light without shadow. We 
might start with the idea of clarity. The demand for clarity is one corollary of the analytical 
philosopher’s commitment to doing away with muddle, and Barrow names clarity as first 
among ‘the criteria that govern the quality of a concept’ (1999, p. 427), and thus by 
implication as foremost among the aims of conceptual analysis. I can see nothing to be said 
for muddle. However the idea of clarity is not as straightforward as it may seem, and repays 
investigation (repays philosophical analysis, one might say). 
First, it is not always noticed that talk of clarity is metaphorical. In the case of water, from 
which the metaphor appears to derive, clarity consists in the fact that you can see through the 
water to rocks and fish below the surface, or to the coral beneath the surface of the sea. Thus 
clear language enables you to see down to the realities beneath. The clarity of the sentence 
‘the earth goes round the sun’ lies in the way it allows you access to the truth that the earth 
does indeed go round the sun, that of the sentence ‘Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas in 
1963’ similarly (though the reality of assassination as opposed to, say, simple murder makes 
for complications). Things become more difficult, though, with ‘Today is Monday’. There is 
no such thing as a Monday, lurking beneath the limpid water. That today is Monday seems 
instead to be a matter of it being neither Sunday nor Tuesday nor any other of the days of the 
week. This simple point lies behind the idea that the meaning of language is constituted less 
by its accurate representation of how things are down there under the water than by systems 
of difference. Meaning and truth are, at least in significant part, a function less of the 
relationship between language and anything else such as the submarine ‘reality’ than of the 
endless and shifting web of language itself. If it is true that Kennedy was assassinated, rather 
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than simply shot, this is a matter of what the dictionary tells us about how the verb ‘to 
assassinate’ is used – it is used in the case of the illicit killing of statesmen and political 
leaders – and cannot be read off from some notional ideal video of ‘the events themselves’. 
(It is often noted that a dictionary offers an excellent image of how language has meaning: in 
an endless web where each definition consists of words, to be looked up where necessary in 
other parts of the dictionary). Some of course go so far as to complain that simplistic ideas of 
clarity are used to fix meaning: that the apparently unobjectionable securing of stability 
through the metaphor of seeing through the water to things that are as surely there as are the 
fish and the coral has a way of turning into a different kind of fix: in which meanings are 
nailed down in  the way it suits particular power groups. (We might think of the difference 
between ‘Mau Mau terrorists killed many Kenyans and British settlers in the 1950s’ and the 
same sentence with ‘freedom fighters’ replacing ‘terrorists’.  Of course ‘British settlers’ 
could be put differently too.) 
The commitment to clarity has one particular and odd consequence. From its origins in 
logical positivism there seems to come the idea that language that is clear will be language of 
a certain kind. It turns its back against the figurative and the metaphorical, as I noted above – 
or it thinks it does, in the case of ‘clarity’ – and prefers what it thinks of as a plain and 
unadorned style. In doing this it frequently adopts the language and style of science, as if the 
best language for philosophical analysis was the language of a scientific report. Two 
examples from texts on the philosophy of education will help to make the point. In the first 
the writer is distinguishing love from other emotions, including hate: 
The evaluations made by a man P who hates his neighbour Q are such as these: 1. He 
wants to avoid Q; he wishes to see him come to grief; when he meets him, he has an 
inclination to say rude things to him – and so on. And he does so, normally, because 
2. He thinks or knows or assumes – ie apprehends – that Q has done something which 
P considers to be evil against him, or that Q as what P seems to be a despicable 
character, or something of the sort... (Pitcher, 1972, p. 383) 
In the second example the writer is analysing the concept of teaching. 
Even though teaching may not be intentional, we have argued that an important point 
of being able to say that B was taught X by A is to locate responsibility for B’s 
learning X. To say, ‘No one taught X to B’, is either to deny that anyone is to be held 
responsible for B’s learning X, or perhaps to suggest that B taught him/herself and is 
the only one to be held responsible. (Kleinig, 1982, p. 29) 
To repeat: if the opposite of clarity is muddle and confusion then the value of clarity is self-
evident (clear, one might say). But clarity all too readily becomes fetishized and one result of 
this is the adoption of a particular kind of writing style, an adoption which is not always 
conscious.  It is typical of this style to aim for the elimination of metaphor, and to value what 
its adherents seem to think of as a tough-minded use of argumentation that imitates the 
unadorned style in which a scientific experiment might be written up and its results 
expressed. Here we might recall that another of the roots of analytic philosophy lies in the 
attempt undertaken by such philosophers as Frege and Russell to create an ideal notation that 
would free thought from the grip of ordinary language and the confusions to which it is 
prone. One outcome of this project, however, which is now widely regarded as having been 
ill-conceived, is the residue in the writings of analytical philosophers of quasi-scientific prose 
in which unacknowledged metaphors from mathematics and algebra are perhaps the most 
vivid evidence that a particular kind of rhetoric has made itself at home.
1
 These roots go 
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deep: they can be traced back without difficulty at least as far as Descartes, for whom 
geometry supplied the model that all sound knowledge should aspire to, on the grounds that it 
attains the highest degree of certainty. 
Along with this yearning for the tropes of science and mathematics analytical philosophers, 
especially those working in the field of education, are prone to a further commitment, tending 
at times to approach the status of dogma. This is to regard philosophical analysis as a body of 
skills and techniques, which can be brought to bear on statements and arguments from a wide 
range of literature, even where the philosopher is not particularly knowledgeable about the 
specific subject matter. Category mistakes, for instance, such as moving incautiously between 
talk of the mind and talk of the brain (see above), can often be identified in the writings of 
neuroscientists and sociobiologists. The fallacy of moving between claims about what is 
empirically the case and non-empirical claims about what must be the case can be found in 
much recent work on happiness and wellbeing (‘Here are some of the things that make people 
happy: a sense of belonging, sufficient income to live on, opportunities for exercise and play 
... if this woman commits herself to writing a novel in a garret, half-starved and in isolation, 
or this man risks his life to work among lepers, it must be because it makes them happy’). 
When British philosophy of education was at what some regard as its acme, some thirty years 
ago, conferences seemed to be patrolled by philosophers in search of such fallacies, eager to 
pounce on an incautious naturalistic fallacy (the so-called fallacy of deriving an ‘ought’ from 
an ‘is’: even then not obviously fallacious: see eg Frankena, 1939) or on a case of ‘because it 
is trivially true it must be importantly true’ (for instance, the idea that because it is true that 
children enjoy play therefore the whole of the curriculum should be based on play).  
These are indeed fallacies and there are others, and people were right to draw attention to 
them. But there was one particularly unfortunate result of the fetishing of analytical 
philosophy in this style. The first was that it became seen in many quarters as an almost 
exclusively destructive discipline, putting forward no substantial theses of its own but 
concentrating on mounting a critique of the efforts of others. In this it was in many respects 
again the natural heir of earlier philosophy. Here is Wittgenstein, writing in the Tractatus      
(§ 6.53), whose decimal notation exemplifies the other legacy I noted above: 
The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing except what can be 
said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with 
philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something 
metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in 
his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other – he would not have 
the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – but it would be the only strictly 
correct method.  
 
A short example from Barrow himself, who is in my view usually one of the least of the 
offenders in this respect, will serve as an illustration. Here he is, in his critique of 
‘postmodernism’, complaining that Jean-Francois Lyotard ‘regards postmodernism as a 
theory that involves “an incredulity towards meta-narratives”’ (Barrow 1999, p. 419; it is 
noticeable that this is the only place in the entire article where Barrow actually quotes one of 
the ‘postmodernists’ that he takes issue with). The problem here, Barrow thinks, is that 
‘Since, in his [Lyotard’s] terms, “meta-narrative” is a synonym for “theory” and “incredulity” 
a soi-disant phrase for “denial”, this means that this is a theory that denies theory’. But an 
attentive reading of Lyotard’s text reveals that meta-narrative is not a synonym for theory in 
general. Metanarratives are those over-arching ideas (hence ‘meta’) that emerged from the 
Enlightenment and that we in the west have largely taken for granted: progress, capitalism, 
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the emancipation of the human spirit, the hegemony of science and scientific knowledge. 
Incidentally, ‘incredulity’ is not a synonym or elegant variation for ‘denial’.  ‘Incredulity’ 
registers what Lyotard thinks we experience as the continual pull of these metanarratives 
even as we begin to lose our faith in, say, capitalism (even if Lyotard did not live to see the 
financial crises of recent years) or worry that the consequences of trying to export western 
notions of progress to the developing world have been mixed. To convict Lyotard of crudely  
asserting the equivalent of p and not-p is too simple and altogether too quick.  
Many of the reservations I have expressed here about analytical philosophy can be brought 
together by observing that the analytical philosopher usually makes a sharp distinction 
between philosophy and other forms of writing, particularly rhetoric. There is, it is generally 
supposed, excellent warrant for this in Plato, who often represents Socrates as mounting a 
critique of rhetoric, in the person for instance of Lysias (in the Phaedrus) and Gorgias in the 
dialogue that bears his name (as noted above). Yet in the Gorgias Socrates observes a 
distinction between good rhetoric and bad. In the Protagoras Socrates says that Protagoras 
would justly make the kinds of criticism of him that he commonly makes of the sophists, the 
travelling salesman, as we have been taught to think of them, of the skills and tricks of 
rhetoric in classical Greece. The distinction between philosophy (hard-edged, rigorous, 
‘scientific’ in its language) and more figurative forms of language, tending towards poetry at 
one extreme, is however hard to maintain in the face of the extended poetic passages and 
rhapsodic myths of the Republic (the myth of Er, and the analogies of Sun, Cave and Divided 
Line, are two of the more obvious examples) or of parts of, say, the Phaedrus (the story of 
the cicadas, the analogy of the charioteer, the story of Theuth and the invention of writing).  
I have written elsewhere (Smith, 2008) about the extreme difficulty of gving any coherent 
account of the distinction between rhetoric and philosophy, and of the contradictions into 
which those philosophers who have addressed the subject tend to fall. Collingwood, for 
instance, writes that the philosopher should adopt a ‘plain and modest’ style, while at the 
same time he praises ‘the classical elegance of Descartes, the lapidary phrases of Spinoza, the 
tortured metaphor-ridden periods of Hegel’ (1933, p. 213). In one remarkable passage, which 
I also quoted in my 2008 paper, he writes: 
 
The principles on which the philosopher uses language are those of poetry; but what 
he writes is not poetry but prose. From the point of view of literary form, this means 
that whereas the poet yields himself to every suggestion that his language makes, and 
so produces word-patterns whose beauty is a sufficient reason for their existence, the 
philosopher’s word-patterns are constructed only to reveal the thought which they 
express, and are valuable not in themselves but as a means to that end. The prose-
writer’s art is an art that must conceal itself, and produce not a jewel that is looked at 
for its own beauty but a crystal in whose depths the thought can be seen without 
distortion or confusion; and the philosophical writer in especial follows the trade not 
of a jeweller but of a lens-grinder. He must never use metaphors or imagery in such a 
way that they attract to themselves the attention due to his thought; if he does that he 
is writing not prose, but, whether well or ill, poetry; but he must avoid this not by 
rejecting all use of metaphors and imagery, but by using them, poetic things 
themselves, in the domestication of prose: using them just so far as to reveal thought, 
and no further. (ibid., pp. 214-5) 
 
The paradox of writing about the philosopher as jeweller or lens-grinder, while at the same 
time declaring that the philosopher ‘must never use metaphors or imagery in such a way that 
they attract to themselves the attention due to his thought’ is obvious enough. To bring this 
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paper round to one of the points with which I began it (in itself a familiar enough rhetorical 
device), Collingwood seems to be undone here by an ambition to separate language from 
thought, to distinguish writing philosophy from thinking it, explicitly referring to the search 
for a ‘principle which must be followed in learning to write philosophy, as distinct from 
learning to think it’ (1933, p. 213), in his commitment to the idea of a language that reveals 
thought rather than distorting it – as if there could be philosophical thought independently of 
language. 
It should be clear now why I wrote above (p. 3) that to identify and describe Barrow’s 
rhetoric does not imply criticism. Far from it: all philosophical writing is rhetorical, in the 
sense that I have been using this word here, and Barrow’s rhetorical style – his writerly style, 
for those still uncomfortable with the idea of rhetoric – bears favourable comparison with 
many writers in the twentieth century analytical tradition, whether they write about education 
or other topics. A degree of self-consciousness of this on Barrow’s part might well have 
formed an obstruction in the deep well of fluent, classical prose that distinguishes him. On 
the other hand it might have given him more sympathy with writers in a different tradition, 
such as Jacques Derrida and Jean-François Lyotard, who have embraced this point with 
enthusiasm: who have released their readers a little to use language, as they do, with a degree 
of playfulness and irony that is itself a challenge to many of the current educational 
tendencies that Barrow would no doubt repudiate – the prevalence of the language of 
economics and neoliberalism, the assumption that all good educational research will be 
‘scientific’, and the substitution of the demands of performativity for serious thought about 
the proper ends of education.  
 
References 
Barrow, R. (1976 ) Common Sense and the Curriculum (London, Allen and Unwin) 
Barrow, R. (1984) Giving Teaching Back to Teachers: a critical introduction to curriculum 
theory (Brighton, Wheatsheaf) 
Barrow, R. (1999) The need for philosophical analysis in a postmodern era. Interchange 30. 
4, 415-432 
Barrow, R. (2006) Moral education’s modest agenda.  Ethics and Education 1. 1, 3-13 
Burbules, N. (2012)The paradigmatic differences between name/date and footnote styles of 
citation. Vlaanderen Fund for Scientific Research: Philosophy and History of the Discipline 
of Education - Evaluation and Evolution of the Criteria for Educational Research, Leuven, 
Belgium, Nov 2012 
 
Collingwood, R.G. (1933) An Essay on Philosophical Method (Oxford, Clarendon Press) 
 
Frankena, W. (1939) The naturalistic fallacy. Mind 48, 464-477 
Holland, R. F. (1980) Against Empiricism: on education, epistemology and value (Oxford, 
Blackwell) 
Kleinig, J. (Philosophical Issues in Education (London, Croom Helm) 
10 
 
Pitcher, G. (1972) Emotion, in  R. Dearden, P. Hirst and R.S. Peters (eds) Education and the 
Development of Reason (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul) 
 
 
Smith, R. (2008) To school with the poets: philosophy, method and clarity.  Paedogogica 
Historica  44.6,  635-645 
Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. (2009) The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost 
Always Do Better (London, Allen Lane) 
Wittgenstein, L. (1963) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul) 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1
 Barrow’s writings are for the most part refreshingly free of this tendency. There are just a few 
examples in some of his earlier works, eg Barrow (1976), pp. 70-71, 82. 
